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California’s Proposition 19: Selective
Prohibition and Equal Basic Liberties
By MARTIN D. CARCIERI*
Prohibition . . . attempts to control a man’s appetite by legislation,
and makes a crime out of things that are not crimes. A Prohibition
law strikes a blow at the very principles upon which our govern-
ment was founded.1
[A] national conversation has quietly begun about the irrationality
of our drug laws.2
There is no debate, merely theater. Discussing drug policy is like
discussing gun control or abortion: facts are irrelevant.3
Criminal justice generally, and drug policy in particular, have been
thoroughly politicized in the United States . . . . Nonetheless, aca-
demic discussion is important to those who aspire to inform their
views by reason and principle.4
[T]he debate is no longer about whether marijuana should be legal-
ized, but rather how precisely the regulations ought to look if mari-
juana is legalized.5
Introduction
IN THE LAND OF EARTHQUAKES, PROPOSITION 19 shook the
political landscape far and wide. This citizens’ initiative, titled “Regu-
* Associate Professor of Political Science, San Francisco State University. J.D., Ph.D.,
University of California, Hastings and Santa Barbara. I wish to thank Professors Brian
Krumm, Barbara Muhlbeier, and Michael Graham, as well as Matt Kumin, Esq., for their
valuable contributions to this project.
1. Often attributed to Abraham Lincoln, Speech to the Illinois House of Representa-
tives (Dec. 18, 1840).
2. Joe Klein, Why Legalizing Marijuana Makes Sense, TIME (Apr. 2, 2009), http://www.
time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1889166,00.html.
3. Stephen J. Dubner, On the Legalization—or Not—of Marijuana, FREAKONOMICS (Oct.
30, 2007, 2:58 PM), http://www.freakonomics.com/2007/10/30/on-the-legalization-or-
not-ofmarijuana/ (quoting Richard Lawrence Miller).
4. Douglas Husak, Do Marijuana Offenders Deserve Punishment?, in POT POLITICS: MARI-
JUANA AND THE COSTS OF PROHIBITION 189 (Mitch Earleywine ed., 2007).
5. Kenneth Falcon, A Lesson in Legalization: Successes and Failures of California’s Proposi-
tion 19, 9 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 463, 475 (2011).
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late, Control and Tax Cannabis Act of 2010” (“RCTCA”),6 appeared
on the 2010 California ballot and would have replaced the state’s re-
gime of marijuana7 prohibition with one of regulation and taxation.8
While the RCTCA was defeated by a 53.5% to 46.5% margin,9 its ef-
fects have been substantial. Beyond pushing the issue to the center of
a national and international debate10 and accelerating the growth of
the cannabis industry,11 it forced the hands of both state and federal
officials.
At the state level, the prospect of the RCTCA’s passage moved the
Governor and legislature to reduce cannabis possession from a misde-
meanor to an infraction one month before the election.12 Two weeks
6. See CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE, CALIFORNIA GENERAL ELECTION OFFICIAL VOTER INFORMA-
TION GUIDE 4, 92–94 (2010), available at http://cdn.sos.ca.gov/vig2010/general/pdf/en-
glish/complete-vig.pdf [hereinafter CALIFORNIA OFFICIAL VOTER INFORMATION GUIDE].
7. I shall use this term synonymously with cannabis. As RCTCA § 11304(d)(1) pro-
vided, “‘Marijuana’ and ‘cannabis’ are interchangeable terms that mean all parts of the
Genus Cannabis, whether growing or not; the resin extracted from any part of the plant;
concentrated cannabis; edible products containing same; and every active compound man-
ufacture, derivative, or preparation of the plant, or resin.” Id. at 94.
8. The California Attorney General’s Office official summary of the RCTCA is as
follows:
• Allows people 21 years old or older to possess, cultivate, or transport mari-
juana for personal use.
• Permits local governments to regulate and tax commercial production . . .
and sale of marijuana to people 21 years old or older.
• Prohibits people from possessing marijuana on school grounds, using it in
public, or smoking it while minors are present.
• Maintains current prohibitions against driving while impaired.
Summary of Legislative Analyst’s Estimate of Net State and Local Government
Fiscal Impact:
• Savings of potentially several tens of millions of dollars annually to the state
and local governments on the costs of incarcerating and supervising certain
marijuana offenders.
CALIFORNIA OFFICIAL VOTER INFORMATION GUIDE, supra note 6, at 12.
9. Votes For and Against November 2, 2010 Statewide Ballot Measures, CAL. SECRETARY ST.
(2010), http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/sov/2010-general/07-for-against.pdf (last visited
Jan. 2, 2012); see also John Hoeffel & Maria L. La Ganga, Youth Vote Falters; Prop 19 Falls
Short, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 3, 2010, at A17.
10. “Proposition 19 . . . is the most talked-about ballot initiative in the country.” John
Hoeffel, Proposition 19: High-Profile Issue, Low-Profile Campaign, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 18, 2010),
http://articles.latimes.com/print/2010/oct/18/local/la-me-pot-campaign-20101018; see
also Editorial, Post-Prop 19, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 5, 2010, at A18 [hereinafter Post-Prop 19].
11. See, e.g., Chip Johnson, Oakland on a Roll with Marijuana Measures, S.F. CHRON.,
Oct. 15, 2010, at C1 (discussing how “businesses in Oakland prepared to respond to the
anticipated market boom” from the RCTCA’s passage); CANNABIS COMMERCE, http://www.
cannabis-commerce.com (last visited Jan. 4, 2012).
12. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11357 (West 2007 & Supp. 2011); Jesse McKin-
ley, California Reduces Its Penalty for Marijuana, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2, 2010, at A9. It has also
lent legitimacy to the legislative reform efforts of Assemblyman Tom Ammiano, including
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later, the Obama administration backtracked on its 2009 claim13 that
it would not interfere with cannabis-related activities that were in com-
pliance with state laws. Attorney General Holder, that is, announced
that if the RCTCA were to pass, federal cannabis prohibition would be
strictly enforced.14 This shift in federal policy has alienated many,15
yet it seems unlikely, standing alone, that it will cost President Obama
the 2012 election. Even if a strong Republican nominee emerges, it is
hard to imagine him criticizing President Obama for being too hard
on state cannabis laws.16
In any case, the RCTCA’s high visibility and controversial nature
made it the focus of much editorial and opinion commentary by lead-
ing California newspapers in the months before the 2010 election.
While none of this commentary disputed the failure of the U.S. War
on Drugs, much of it was critical of the RCTCA, and urged citizens to
vote against the initiative.17 This media criticism merits a reply for
support from some Republicans. See Marisa Lagos & Wyatt Buchanan, Ammiano Finds Un-
likely Ally, S.F. CHRON., June 4, 2011, at C1.
13. See David Johnston & Neil A. Lewis, Ending Raids of Dispensers of Marijuana for Pa-
tients, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 19, 2009, at A20.
14. See Editorial, The Feds Weigh in on Prop. 19, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 27, 2010, at A15;
Adam Nagourney, U.S. Will Enforce Marijuana Laws, State Vote Aside, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 16,
2010, at A1; The Feds Say No Way, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 20, 2010, at A20. Most recently, federal
prosecutors in California have “announced a campaign . . . to shut down scores of mari-
juana dispensaries, which they described as profit-making criminal enterprises masquerad-
ing as suppliers of medicine.” Bob Egelko, Profitable Pot Stores Facing Closure by U.S., S.F.
CHRON., Oct. 8, 2011, at A1.
15. See, e.g., John Hoeffel, Suit Seeks End to Pot Raids, Threats, L.A. TIMES Oct. 29, 2011,
at AA3.
16. I have argued, however, that if reelected, Obama will be inclined, and ought, to
call on Congress to reschedule cannabis under the federal Controlled Substances Act
(“CSA”), allowing states to go their own way within federal guidelines. See Martin D.
Carcieri, Obama, the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Drug War, 44 AKRON L. REV. 303, 305, 308
(2011).
17. See, e.g., Editorial, Experimenting with Pot: The Broader Desire to Legalize Marijuana Is
No Reason to Vote for a Badly Flawed Prop. 19, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 30, 2010, at A26; Editorial, If
California Goes to Pot, Rest of U.S. Gets Dragged In, USA TODAY, Oct. 20, 2010, at 8A; Gil
Kerlikowske, John Walters, Barry McCaffrey, Lee Brown, Bob Martinez & William Bennett,
Op-Ed, California Should Just Say No, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 25, 2010, at A17 [hereinafter Drug
Czars] (written by former or sitting directors of the Office of National Drug Control Policy
(“ONDCP”)); Editorial, No on Prop. 19, S.F. CHRON., Sept. 16, 2010, at A15; George Skelton,
A Dopey Measure on Pot, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 11, 2010, at A2; Editorial, Vote No on Prop. 19: A
Debate on Legalizing Marijuana May Be Needed, But This Initiative Has Too Many Flaws, L.A.
TIMES, Sept. 24, 2010, at A18; Post-Prop 19, supra note 10; Bonnie Dumanis et al., Op-Ed, R
Prop 19: The Promise Is Not the Reality, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB. (Oct. 3, 2010), http://www.
signonsandiego.com/news/2010/oct/03/prop-19-promise-not-reality/.
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three reasons: (1) it includes some valid concerns;18 (2) it contains a
great deal of sophistry;19 and (3) it is a debate that will continue. In-
deed, it will be renewed with vigor as California and other states place
revised versions of the RCTCA on the ballot in 2012 and beyond.20
The day after the vote, the Los Angeles Times wrote:
Although Proposition 19 did not prevail at the polls . . . . [It] won
the backing of a whopping 64% of voters aged 18 to 34 . . . .
Certainly the campaign transformed the public dialogue on
drug policy. . . . But Proposition 19 was a badly drafted mess. Voters
were deciding on regulations for Californians to live by, not theo-
retical principles. If the backers of legalization want to reopen the
discussion, they need to work out the kinks that were deal-breakers
for many voters, including the measure’s potentially chaotic regula-
tory scheme and its ludicrous workplace protections for marijuana-
smoking employees.
Once that’s done, the debate can get underway in earnest.
What would legalization do to the drug cartels? Would it increase
18. These concerns, we shall see, ranged from the regulatory chaos it was said the new
regime would cause to the law’s impact on children, highway safety, workplace conditions,
and rates of cannabis use and addiction.
19. In attacking Proposition 19, that is, the op/ed critics did what those who defend
cannabis prohibition have long done—associate cannabis use with violence, impugn the
motives of those who favor ending prohibition, and use vague, imprecise terms like “drugs”
rather than cannabis and “legalization” rather than regulation—thus obscuring distinc-
tions crucial in serious policy, legal, and constitutional debate. Such moves undermined
their credibility, to be sure, yet again they raised valid policy concerns that merit a reply. As
Kenneth Falcon writes of the No on 19 Campaign, its arguments “are at times meritorious
but at others, completely unfounded.” Falcon, supra note 5, at 473. R
20. Beyond California, refined versions of Proposition 19 are in process in Colorado
and Washington. See, e.g., Jesse McKinley, Backers of Legal Marijuana Find Silver Lining in
Defeat of California Measure, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 2010, at A24; Gene Johnson, Former Seattle
U.S. Attorney Pushes Pot Legalization, SEATTLE TIMES (June 21, 2011), http://seattletimes.
nwsource.com/html/localnews/2015387076_apwalegalizingmarijuana1stldwritethru.html;
Eric Risberg, Pot Backers Get Approval for Calif. Ballot Petitions, USA TODAY (July 26, 2011),
http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2011-07-26-marijuana-legalization-california-bal-
lot_n.htm. While the initiatives have qualified for the ballot in Washington and Colorado,
the attempts in California are floundering since several groups are pushing different ver-
sions. Joe Mozingo, Pot Backers’ Ballot Effort in Disarray; Marijuana Legalization Activists Vowed
to Craft Initiative for 2012. Now, Four Camps Vie for Funding, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 10, 2012, at A1.
In passing, it is noteworthy that in Congress, Representatives Barney Frank (D-MA)
and Ron Paul (R-TX) recently co-authored a House bill that would remove cannabis from
Schedule I of the Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 801–904 (2006), yielding pri-
mary control of cannabis policy to the states under their police power within loose federal
guidelines. Ending Federal Marijuana Prohibition Act, H.R. 2306, 112th Cong. (1st Sess.
2011); see Federal Ban on Pot Targeted by Bill Introduced by Ron Paul, Barney Frank,
Huffington Post (June 23, 2011), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/06/23/federal-
ban-on-pot-bill_n_883652.html. Although “the Bill has no chance of passing the Republi-
can-controlled House,” and indeed will even not be taken up by the House Judiciary Com-
mittee, it keeps the issue in the public eye. Id. I shall return to the Frank/Paul bill, infra
Part III.A.
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the drug’s availability? Is marijuana more harmful than alcohol or
not? What would be the effect of legalization on prices? On chil-
dren? Could legalization be accomplished without provoking a
conflict with federal law? What tax revenues really could be cap-
tured? It’s not enough merely to say that the nation’s current drug
policy isn’t working. Proponents of legalization must show that
they won’t be condoning drug use, that they can raise badly
needed revenue and generally improve the quality of life for the
state’s residents.21
While I shall try to avoid vague words like “legalization” (rather
than “regulation”) and “drugs” (instead of “cannabis”), I shall try to
meet the Los Angeles Times’ challenge. Kenneth Falcon has already
gone far in this direction, suggesting specific changes to various provi-
sions of the RCTCA for those redrafting it for placement on state bal-
lots in 2012 and beyond.22 As a legal counselor, he is engaged in the
circumscribed, essentially empirical, work of advising clients how best
to maximize the chances of achieving their goals in light of existing
law. My target audience, by contrast, consists of those with the power
to change existing law—the voters (by way of editorial page editors). I
am thus speaking from an underlying normative constitutional per-
spective.23 While this will include a reply to structural concerns over
intergovernmental relations, the core of my reply is substantive as
follows.24
As harmful as alcohol and tobacco are, Americans have con-
cluded for reasons well and widely understood25 that the best public
policy approach for both of these substances is that of education and
21. Post-Prop. 19, supra note 10. R
22. See Falcon, supra note 5, at 475. R
23. While I agree with the bulk of Falcon’s analysis, I shall depart from it places. In his
discussion of the Drug Free Workplace Act, for example, he understandably takes federal
cannabis prohibition as given—a fact of life. Falcon, supra note 5, at 475–77. I share no R
such assumption, taking the view that such prohibition is flatly unconstitutional under a
fair application of leading Fourteenth Amendment case law, and so should be resisted by
every legal means available. Beyond this, we shall see, Falcon simply accepts as legitimate
the interests of law enforcement in maintaining federal cannabis prohibition so that their
livelihoods—their economic interests—are not disrupted. Id. at 487. I shall argue against
this as well, from a Rawlsian perspective.
24. Organization is a challenge, of course, when replying to a range of critiques of a
ballot initiative. On reflection, it seems best to make the substantive case before speaking
to structural concerns.
25. Not only did the United States repeal alcohol prohibition as a political, economic,
and constitutional failure, see U.S. CONST. amend. XXI, but in a free society, adults must
presumptively be allowed to decide what will go into their bodies. See, e.g., DANIEL OKRENT,
LAST CALL: THE RISE AND FALL OF PROHIBITION 373 (2010).
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time, place, and manner regulation.26 With regard to cannabis, by con-
trast, federal and most state law still employs criminal prohibition for
any possession or use, even by adults, and even in the home.27 I shall
argue that this stark inconsistency grossly violates the core principle of
constitutional democracy—equal, basic liberties—particularly as ar-
ticulated in leading Fourteenth Amendment case law.28 It is from the
constitutional perspective of the equal liberty principle—which re-
quires that the law be reasonably fair, rational, and consistent—that I
shall respond to the bulk of the opinion and editorial critics’ attacks
on the RCTCA.
In the passage cited above, the Los Angeles Times refers dismis-
sively to “theoretical principles.” Yet the equal liberty principle ended
slavery, Jim Crow, and legal discrimination against women, gays, and
the disabled. From private employment to voting rights, from taxation
to public benefits, we all rely on this principle of equal liberty. Under
the social contract, particularly the golden rule at its core, citizens are
obliged to apply this principle fairly to others. It cannot be dismissed
with a label, even by a respected editorial page. I thus conclude, and
shall argue, that the critics fail to justify voting against revisions of the
RCTCA in 2012 and beyond, particularly if they incorporate refine-
ments like those suggested by Falcon.29
I. Substance: The Equal Liberty Principle
A commitment to liberty and equality lies at the core of a consti-
tutional democracy. As Aristotle wrote: “The underlying idea of the
democratic type of constitution is liberty. . . . The democratic concep-
26. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. XXI (ending alcohol prohibition by repealing U.S.
CONST. amend. XVIII and turning regulatory authority over intoxicating beverages to
states); Laws Regulating the Sale and Distribution of Tobacco to Minors, TOBACCOWATCHDOG.
ORG, http://www.tobaccowatchdog.org/laws.htm (last visited Jan. 2, 2012) (setting forth at
length the various federal and state laws restricting actions related to tobacco).
27. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. §§ 801–904 (2006) (consisting of the operative provisions of the
federal Controlled Substances Act prohibiting any possession or use of cannabis for any-
one); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 11357–11361 (West 2007 & Supp. 2011) (consisting
of California provisions prohibiting and punishing possession or sale of cannabis).
28. This inconsistency is precisely the point of analytical departure in Kimani Paul-
Emile, Making Sense of Drug Regulation: A Theory of Law for Drug Control Policy, 19 CORNELL
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 691 (2010).
29. The Los Angeles Times placed the burden of persuasion on those who support end-
ing cannabis prohibition. Yet insofar as that prohibition would be subject to strict scrutiny
under relevant Fourteenth Amendment case law, this is constitutionally unsupportable. See
Carcieri, supra note 16. As Husak notes, the burden must always be on those defending the R
status quo “when that status quo involves criminalization.” Husak, supra note 4, at 191–92. R
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tion of justice is the enjoyment of arithmetical equality . . . .”30 In
Locke’s view, since humans are free and equal in the state of nature,
any legitimate, stable government must treat them as essentially free
and equal when they come into civil society under the social con-
tract.31 Fusing liberty and equality into one principle, Rawls writes that
the bedrock norm of a democratic constitution is the principle that
“each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive scheme of
equal basic liberties compatible with a similar scheme of liberties for
others.”32 The equal liberty principle, Rawls argues, is one that ra-
tional, self-interested persons would unanimously select behind a veil
of ignorance about the details of their own lives to govern their society
in perpetuity once they know those details.33 The U.S. Constitution
protects equal basic liberties in the first instance through structural
features, like separation of powers, checks and balances, and federal-
ism.34 In addition, the Bill of Rights and later amendments have ena-
bled further development of the equal liberty principle as a matter of
jurisprudential doctrine.35
Three related premises underlie the equal liberty principle. First,
society is entitled to band together and, through the state it creates,
enforce rules that prevent or punish harm or serious risk of harm to
legitimate collective interests.36 John Stuart Mill’s harm principle thus
forms the core of much U.S. constitutional doctrine.37 Second, while
30. ARISTOTLE, THE POLITICS OF ARISTOTLE 258 (Ernest Barker trans., Oxford Univ.
Press 1958) (c. 350 B.C.E.) (footnote omitted). As Finley observes, democracy is ordered
liberty, a “balancing act between freedom and safety.” M. I. FINLEY, DEMOCRACY ANCIENT
AND MODERN 112 (1973).
31. See JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 4–65 (J. W. Gough ed.,
Blackwell Basil & Mott, Ltd. 3d ed. 1966) (1690).
32. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 53 (1971).
33. Id. at 10–15.
34. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 281–82 (James Madison) (J.R. Pole ed., 2005).
35. See Carcieri, supra note 16, at 309–28 (discussing the Supreme Court’s equal pro- R
tection and due process case law). U.S. CONST. amends. XIX, XXI, XXIV, and XXVI pro-
vide further examples.
36. As Chief Justice Marshall wrote, “the people have an original right to establish, for
their future government, such principles as, in their opinion, shall most conduce to their
own happiness, is the basis[ ] on which the whole American fabric has been erected.” Mar-
bury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176 (1803); see also THE DECLARATION OF INDEPEN-
DENCE (U.S. 1776).
37. As Mill wrote:
[T]he sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in
interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number, is self-protection. . . .
[T]he only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member
of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others.
JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 21–22 (John W. Parker & Son 2d ed. 1859). Thus, beyond
rules like those of tort law requiring proof of substantial harm for recovery for negligence,
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liberty must be ordered, liberty is the rule in a democracy, not the
exception.38 Third, each person’s liberty must be protected equally, or
at least roughly equally. Civil liberty thus is necessarily fused with
equality.39 Where the law creates a presumption of liberty, each per-
son has a vital interest in not having his liberty denied while others are
allowed an equal or more harmful liberty. This is especially so where
the criminal law is used, and emphatically so where the more harmful
liberty is allowed for reasons well and widely understood. To the ex-
tent that a political regime fails to protect basic liberties like bodily
autonomy in a substantially equal fashion it is illegitimate and unsta-
ble, losing its character as a constitutional democracy.
A. Equality: Equal Protection
The Supreme Court has developed this third premise of equally
protected liberty into constitutional doctrine. The central command
of the equal protection clause, the Court has held, is that government
may not treat differently those who are similarly situated.40 Rawls calls
this “justice as regularity,”41 and, as the Court wrote in the seminal
case of Skinner v. Oklahoma: “When the law lays an unequal hand on
those who have committed intrinsically the same quality of offense . . .
it has made as invidious a discrimination as if it had selected a particu-
lar race or nationality for oppressive treatment.”42
More recently, the Court has observed, “Our cases have recog-
nized successful equal protection claims brought by a ‘class of one,’
where the plaintiff alleges that she has been intentionally treated dif-
ferently from others similarly situated and that there is no rational
the Supreme Court has held that government must show that the harm allegedly posed by
speech it seeks to suppress is imminent and serious. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444,
447 (1969). As for criminal law, Husak notes, the seriousness of a crime is based on two
variables: harm and culpability. See Husak, supra note 4, at 189, 195–204. R
38. As Justice Douglas famously asserted in the First Amendment context, “free
speech is the rule, not the exception.” Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 585 (1951)
(Douglas, J., dissenting).
39. As Professor Tribe has observed in the Fourteenth Amendment context, substan-
tive due process “is a narrative in which due process and equal protection, far from having
separate missions and entailing different inquiries, are profoundly interlocked in a legal
double helix. It is a single, unfolding tale of equal liberty . . . .” Laurence H. Tribe, Lawrence v.
Texas: The “Fundamental Right” That Dare Not Speak Its Name, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1893, 1898
(2004) (emphasis added).
40. Since perfection, i.e., mathematical precision, is never the standard for human
institutions like government, this rule must be understood as forbidding substantially dis-
similar treatment of those who are substantially similarly situated.
41. See RAWLS, supra note 32, at 207–09. R
42. 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942); see also McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 194 (1964).
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basis for the difference in treatment.”43 This principle, Judge Posner
has observed, is a basic element of the economic theory of law: “[T]o
count as law, a command . . . must treat equally those who are simi-
larly situated in all respects relevant to the command.”44 Under the
equal liberty principle as embodied in the Fourteenth Amendment,
the law may not treat differently individuals who are similarly situated
in terms of the risk of actual harm their exercise of liberty poses to
legitimate collective interests.
Cannabis prohibition raises a number of equal protection is-
sues.45 RCTCA critics raised an important issue with their claim that
since alcohol and tobacco already cause serious problems we should
not aggravate those problems by ending cannabis prohibition. As the
district attorney, sheriff, and a local police chief in San Diego wrote,
“It’s not smart to legalize another mind-altering substance, putting
more drivers under the influence on our roads.”46 USA Today ex-
pressed “concerns about what legalizing another intoxicant besides al-
cohol could do to public safety and health,”47 and as columnist
George Skelton added, “Legalizing ‘recreational’ dope would create
yet another problem for the state.”48
Such claims are not new.49 They rely on one indisputable pre-
mise, among others: democracy is ordered liberty, and liberty may,
43. Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000) (citing Sioux City Bridge
Co. v. Dakota Cnty., 260 U.S. 441 (1923)); Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. Cnty. Comm’n,
488 U.S. 336 (1989)); see also Att’y Gen. of N.Y. v. Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. 898 (1986); Wein-
berger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975). As Husak writes, the key ideas here are consis-
tency (in the restriction of liberty, especially where the criminal law is used) and
proportionality (of offense to criminal punishment), based on the degree of harm or risk
of serious harm to legitimate collective interests the offense poses. See Husak, supra note 4, R
at 195, 203–04.
44. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 393 (1972).
45. I have suggested elsewhere that the racial disparities in the impact of the drug war
alone, particularly the war on cannabis, constitute an equal protection violation. At the
very least, I have argued, under a fair reading of the Supreme Court’s Fourteenth Amend-
ment case law, cannabis prohibition is subject to strict judicial scrutiny. This is both be-
cause it burdens the fundamental right of bodily autonomy and, in effect, uses the suspect
classification of race. See Carcieri, supra note 16, at 311–16, 324–26. R
46. Dumanis et al., supra note 17. R
47. If California Goes to Pot, Rest of U.S. Gets Dragged In, supra note 17. R
48. Skelton, supra note 17. As Falcon observes, “[p]roponents of prohibition no R
longer claim that marijuana causes insanity and death . . . but simply claim that it is very,
very bad for you and therefore should remain illegal.” Falcon, supra note 5, at 469. R
49. As the Office of National Drug Control Policy has written, for example, “[a]lcohol
and tobacco cost society a great deal every year in terms of crime, lost productivity, trage-
dies and death. Why legalize marijuana and add a third drug to the current list of licit
threats?” OFFICE OF NAT’L DRUG CONTROL POLICY, WHAT AMERICANS NEED TO KNOW ABOUT
MARIJUANA: IMPORTANT FACTS ABOUT OUR NATION’S MOST MISUNDERSTOOD ILLEGAL DRUG
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indeed must, be restricted in some ways, even if that means occasion-
ally using the blunt instrument of the criminal law. From a constitu-
tional perspective, the problem is that these writers implicitly move
from this premise directly to the conclusion that government may
therefore draw the line between criminal and lawful acts wherever it
chooses. This step in reasoning is seriously mistaken. Our bedrock con-
stitutional principle is not liberty. It is equal liberty.
From this perspective of equal liberty, then, we notice immedi-
ately that regulation and prohibition are fundamentally distinct legal
regimes. The contrast between them is one of kind, not just degree.
The cannabis user on the one hand and the alcohol drinker or to-
bacco smoker on the other are thus unquestionably “differently
treated” under our law. They are similarly situated, further, in that the
cannabis user poses no greater harm to legitimate state interests than
does the drinker or smoker. Indeed, studies have long shown that the
former is far less a threat to those interests, not more so.50 If consump-
8, available at http://www.cadca.org/files/policy_priorities/ONDCPMarijuanaFacts.pdf
(last visited Jan. 3, 2012). As Sabet adds:
[U]sing [cannabis] frequently . . . may contribute to respiratory problems and
lung changes consistent with precancerous states . . . . Marijuana also appears to
contribute to other cancers . . . and mental illness. . . . Even a cursory glance at
the status of [alcohol and tobacco] shows us that to add a third drug to this list
would exacerbate an already difficult public health problem.
Kevin A. Sabet, The (Often Unheard) Case for Marijuana Leniency, in POT POLITICS: MARIJUANA
AND THE COSTS OF PROHIBITION, supra note 4, at 328, 341. Referring to “drugs” generally, R
the DEA asks: “[H]ow much misery can already be attributed to alcoholism and smoking?
[Instead] misery and addiction . . . would accompany the outright legalization of drugs.”
U.S. DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMIN., SPEAKING OUT AGAINST DRUG LEGALIZATION 14, 45
(2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/dea/demand/speak_out_101210.pdf.
50. As one prominent study concluded, “an objective consideration of marijuana
shows that it is responsible for less damage to the individual and to society than are alcohol
and cigarettes . . . .” Edward P. O’Brien et al., Twentieth Annual Report of the Research Advisory
Panel, SCHAFFER LIBRARY DRUG POL’Y (1989), available at http://www.druglibrary.org/schaf-
fer/Library/studies/caresadv/default.htm. According to an article in The Lancet, a leading
British medical journal, “The smoking of cannabis, even long term, is not harmful to
health.” Editorial, Deglamorising Cannabis, 346 LANCET 1241 (1995). The Lancet later noted,
“[I]t would be reasonable to judge cannabis as less of a threat to health than alcohol or
tobacco.” Editorial, Dangerous Habits, 352 LANCET 1565 (1998). A study recently commis-
sioned by the U.S. government concluded that users of marijuana are less likely to become
dependent on the drug in comparison to alcohol or nicotine. INST. OF MED., MARIJUANA
AND MEDICINE: ASSESSING THE SCIENCE BASE 98 (Janet E. Joy, Stanley J. Watson, Jr. & John A.
Benson, Jr. eds., 1999) [hereinafter IOM]. As Grinspoon and Bakalar summarize:
After carefully monitoring the literature for more than two decades, we have con-
cluded that the only well-confirmed deleterious physical effect of marihuana is
harm to the pulmonary system. . . . Marihuana smoke burdens the lungs with
three times more tars (insoluble particulates) and five times more carbon monox-
ide than tobacco smoke. The respiratory system also retains more of the tars,
because marihuana smoke is inhaled more deeply and held in the lungs longer.
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tion of all three substances were treated the same—either all regu-
lated or all prohibited—then the law would violate equal liberty on
that ground alone. Yet, under U.S. and most state law, the possession
and use of cannabis by adults is punished more harshly, subject to pro-
hibition, not mere regulation.51 The problem is thus not simply that
cannabis users are similarly situated to alcohol drinkers and tobacco
smokers and treated differently. The law’s imbalance—its dispropor-
tionality—is even greater: far from posing as much risk to genuine
state interests as those who drink and smoke, especially in public,
adult cannabis users pose less risk, especially in the home. On a fair
application of the equal liberty principle, then, the legal punishment
for tobacco or alcohol use, particularly in public, should be greater
for cannabis, not less. Yet under U.S. law and that of many states, the
reverse is true, thus magnifying the degree to which our law violates
the principle of equal basic liberties.
Since this is a vital point, a further illustration is in order. If it
truly did not matter, as critics imply, where government draws the line
between legal and criminal acts, then the United States could punish
alcohol use based on gender, or tobacco use based on race with the
following hypothetical statement on the DEA and ONDCP web pages:
“Alcohol abuse by men imposes great social costs each year in terms of
crime, lost productivity, accidents, and death. Why allow women to
use alcohol and increase these bad outcomes? Moreover, cigarettes
kill hundreds of thousands of whites each year. Why allow blacks to
suffer this burden as well?”
On the other hand, even the heaviest marihuana smokers rarely use as much as
the average tobacco smoker does. So far not a single case of lung cancer, emphy-
sema, or other significant pulmonary pathology attributable to cannabis use has
been reported in the United States.
LESTER GRINSPOON & JAMES B. BAKALAR, MARIHUANA, THE FORBIDDEN MEDICINE 250 (rev. ed.
1997).
By contrast, alcohol-related deaths total more than 100,000 per year, and tobacco
causes more than 400,000 deaths per year. See Ali H. Mokdad, James S. Marks, Donna F.
Stroup & Julie L. Gerberding, Actual Causes of Death in the United States, 2000, 291 JAMA
1238, 1240 (2004). Thus, “[t]hough cannabis use is not without harm, especially for adoles-
cents, as a source of danger it is surely trumped by alcohol, tobacco, reckless driving, crimi-
nality, and unsafe sexual behavior . . . .” ROBERT J. MACCOUN & PETER REUTER, DRUG WAR
HERESIES: LEARNING FROM OTHER VICES, TIMES, AND PLACES 345 (2001).
In light of all this, the Los Angeles Times seemed to hurt its credibility when it asked, the
day after the RCTCA’s defeat, “[i]s marijuana more harmful than alcohol or not?” Post-Prop
19, supra note 10. R
51. See State Laws, NORML, http://norml.org/laws (last visited Jan. 3, 2012); State Ma-
rijuana Laws, FINDLAW, http://law.findlaw.com/state-laws/marijuana (last visited Jan. 3,
2012).
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Stock claims of the need to protect women and minorities not-
withstanding, such a law is plainly irrational and unconstitutional. It is
not enough for government to declare that it will allow some bad
things but criminalize others.52 Equal liberty and the rule of law de-
52. In passing, as an illustration of the double standard critics employ regarding can-
nabis, it is notable that some of them implicitly or explicitly apply criteria for ending can-
nabis prohibition that would never apply to other drugs, even more dangerous ones. For
example, as the drug czars write, “legalized marijuana can’t solve California’s budget crisis
. . . .” Drug Czars, supra note 17. Taxing alcohol and tobacco do not solve this problem R
either, and yet the critics do not call for their prohibition on that account.
As another example, the Los Angeles Times declares that those who favor ending canna-
bis prohibition “must show . . . that they can . . . generally improve the quality of life for the
state’s residents.” Post-Prop 19, supra note 10. Yet, if proof of improving “the quality of life R
for the state’s residents” were truly the criterion for regulating rather than prohibiting a
substance’s ingestion, alcohol and tobacco would be prohibited. The Twenty-First Amend-
ment was ratified not because anyone proved that alcohol would improve residents’ quality
of life, but rather because prohibition was a policy, economic, and constitutional failure.
OKRENT, supra note 25, at 373. R
As a third example, Dumanis et al. write that “[d]rug cartels will not be driven out of
business by this initiative.” Dumanis et al., supra note 17; see also Sylvia Longmire, Op-Ed, R
Legalization Won’t Kill the Cartels, N.Y. TIMES, June 19, 2011, at WK10. Beyond the fact that
such claims are hard to prove or disprove in advance, the cartels are resourceful and sur-
vive on much more than the cannabis trade. Even if ending cannabis prohibition would
not destroy them, then, (and what reliably would?) this is no reason to maintain cannabis
prohibition. In any case, such claims are a diversion. The point is that cannabis prohibi-
tion, while far more dangerous drugs are merely regulated for reasons well understood,
violates equal liberty.
Finally, critics impugn the motives of RCTCA supporters, particularly Richard Lee
(sponsor of the RCTCA and president of Oaksterdam University). See, e.g., Skelton, supra
note 17. I have two replies. First, even assuming Lee’s motives are partly financial, since R
when has the profit motive been suspect, especially from the conservative stance taken by
RCTCA critics? Second, if speculation about motives is part of the discussion, then what
about the motives of the critics with “vested interests in maintaining prohibition”? GRIN-
SPOON & BAKALAR, supra note 50, at 266. The critics of the RCTCA, we have seen, include R
drug czars, sheriffs, prosecutors, and corrections officials. Yet “legislators . . . respond
largely to interest groups. And there’s a massive lobby out there, pushing the drug war—
the police chiefs, sheriffs, prosecutors and their allies in the federal enforcement bureaus.”
Neal Peirce, Economists Make Case for Decentralizing the War on Drugs, DULUTH NEWS-TRIB.,
Sept. 29, 2003. As Falcon adds, in reference to the No on Proposition 19 Campaign, “[t]he
No Campaign’s donor list included those who benefit most from the prohibition of mari-
juana, most notably the alcohol industry and law enforcement community.” Falcon, supra
note 5, at 469. R
While this is an important point, Falcon later writes that “mitigating potential job loss
in the law enforcement community is a valid goal.” Id. at 487. Here I must disagree. From a
Rawlsian perspective, this elevates the narrow view of economic agents seeking primarily to
ensure their current power and income stream over the broad view they would take as
citizens of a democracy. Like those in the alcohol, tobacco, pharmaceutical, and prison
industries, law enforcement officers have no legitimate expectation that private adult can-
nabis use will forever remain a crime simply so that their profits and employment will be
maintained. The social contract of a reasonably just society, one worth passing onto their
children and grandchildren, would never contain such a provision. For citizens voting on
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mand that legal classifications be principled. At the very least, they
cannot be plainly arbitrary and irrational, especially where the crimi-
nal law’s coercive power is used.53
In sum, the critics’ claim that cannabis prohibition must be main-
tained even while alcohol and tobacco are merely regulated for rea-
sons that are well understood,54 glosses over and fails to speak to the
violation of equal basic liberties embodied in this contradiction.55
B. Liberty: Due Process
Yet, the critics might seem to have a reply. Some of them suggest
that cannabis prohibition is justified because it is not a high law en-
forcement priority. For example, Skelton cites police and prison offi-
cials for the claim that “relatively little, in fact, is spent nabbing or
prosecuting marijuana users.”56 The drug czars assure us that “[l]aw
enforcement officers do not currently focus much effort on arresting
adults whose only crime is possessing small amounts of marijuana.”57
As Dumanis et al. argue:
At first blush, Prop. 19 may sound like common sense, promising
cost savings through fewer prosecutions. This is a hollow promise
because possession of small amounts of marijuana now is a minor
offense punishable by a $100 fine and no time in jail. As prosecu-
revisions of the RCTCA in upcoming elections, this is not a legitimate concern any more
than maintaining a needlessly complex and confusing tax code is justifiable simply because
reform would put many tax lawyers out of business.
53. As one further illustration, the Court has held that in regulating abortion, “the
State has legitimate interests from the outset of the pregnancy in protecting . . . the life of
the fetus that may become a child.” Planned Parenthood of Se. Penn. v. Casey, 505 U.S.
833, 846 (1992). Nonetheless, a woman has a limited constitutional right to override that
interest by exercising her bodily autonomy to expel the fetus from her body. See id. In this
light, it would be hard to show that an adult who consumes cannabis in private poses more
harm to legitimate state interests than a woman who obtains an abortion.
54. See supra note 25. R
55. As Joe Klein writes: “There are those who believe—with some good reason—that
the accretion of legalized vices is debilitating, that we are a less virtuous society since gam-
bling spilled out from Las Vegas to ‘riverboats’ and state lotteries across the country.”
Klein, supra note 2. R
Whatever the ethical merits of this claim, it cannot be our guide in determining the
proper scope of constitutional rights. It implicitly elevates the good over the right. See
Rawls, supra note 32, at 392–96. Beyond this, Congress and the states have never consist- R
ently been concerned with promoting the good. Had they been, then since promoting the
good means criminalizing harmful substances, then everything harmful—unhealthy foods
as well as alcohol and tobacco—would long have been criminally prohibited.
56. Skelton, supra note 17. R
57. Drug Czars, supra note 17. R
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tors, we’re not spending a large amount of time or money on these
cases because offenders typically just pay the fine.58
To be sure, this claim seems especially persuasive now that adult
cannabis possession is merely an infraction in California—a particu-
larly “minor” offense. Yet, so long as more dangerous substances are
merely regulated, there is no apparent justification for cannabis pro-
hibition regardless of the criminal punishment imposed. Thus, regula-
tion seems the appropriate regime for all the substances.
Beyond this, one must ask why police and prosecutors allegedly
put so little effort into enforcing cannabis prohibition against adults.
Like the California legislators who so easily came together to make
cannabis possession an infraction when it seemed the RCTCA might
pass, police and prosecutors know that adults who merely possess and
use cannabis pose no harm to society that would justify the time and
resources that could otherwise be used on prosecuting dangerous
criminals, like drunk drivers.
Most importantly, the claim that cannabis prohibition is justifia-
ble since it is not consistently enforced rests on a fatally flawed pre-
mise. The critics implicitly assume that where a law is such that no one
defends its vigorous enforcement, the police can simply be trusted to
apply it in an even-handed way. However, as Husak notes, “Laws that
still exist can be enforced occasionally and selectively.”59 Indeed, the
racially disparate impact of the drug war confirms the discriminatory
way in which the war on cannabis is fought.60 This violates due pro-
58. Dumanis et al., supra note 17. R
59. Douglas Husak, For Drug Legalization, in DOUGLAS HUSAK & PETER DE MARNEFFE,
THE LEGALIZATION OF DRUGS 12–13 (2005) [hereinafter Husak II]. As an example of the
inconsistency in enforcement of the war on cannabis, a writer on the cannabis laws in
California’s Mendocino County, among the most permissive in the country, observes that
“[t]he county’s liberal guidelines are just that—guidelines tacitly respected by federal offi-
cials who still operate elsewhere under U.S. law banning pot of any quantity.” Kevin Fagan,
Burning Issue in Pot Country, S.F. CHRON., May 31, 2008, at A1.
60. As a retired police chief has written, “[T]he drug war has become a race war in
which nonwhites are arrested and imprisoned at four to five times the rate whites are, even
though most drug crimes are committed by whites.” William F. Buckley Jr., Kurt Schmoke,
Joseph D. McNamara & Robert W. Sweet, The War on Drugs is Lost, in BUSTED: STONE COW-
BOYS, NARCO-LORDS AND WASHINGTON’S WAR ON DRUGS 209 (Mike Gray ed., 2002). As Cole
adds, “[t]he racial profiling studies also make clear that the war on drugs has largely been a
war on minorities.” David D. Cole, Formalism, Realism, and the War on Drugs, 35 SUFFOLK U.
L. REV. 241, 248 (2001). As two authors explain:
[A] policy pattern suggested by the history of alcohol and narcotics prohibition is
that the likelihood of prohibitory drug legislation is increased when the drug is
identified with ethnic minorities . . . . Users of opium were often Chinese; street
users of cocaine, and later heroin as well, were often perceived as black and West
Indian; intemperate users of alcohol were often Irish, Italian, or German; and
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cess,61 and more broadly, the equal liberty principle. The remedy for
any harm from cannabis use is not police discretion to apply a law that
no one thinks should be vigorously enforced—it is to treat cannabis
no more harshly than more dangerous substances.
II. Other Policy Concerns in the Equal Liberty Perspective
Thus far, I have argued that the core constitutional principle of
equal basic liberties undermines two of the critics’ most common at-
tacks on the RCTCA. With this fundamental principle in full view, I
will now take up the critics’ other plausible concerns. These divide
roughly into two categories: (1) harms to self/user such as addiction
and increased use; and (2) harms to others, including effects on chil-
dren, the workplace, and highway safety. Since Falcon has spoken to
aspects of these concerns, the comments that follow are designed to
complement his.
A. Harms to Self: Addiction and Increased Use
At the outset, it is not clear that any harm a person does to him-
self is, standing alone, a legitimate basis for criminal punishment in a
constitutional democracy.62 This is especially so since whatever the
harms of cannabis, the harms of alcohol and tobacco use are far
greater.63 Yet some critics of the RCTCA grounded their concerns in
the addiction justification, and so we begin there.
Some addictions are beneficial. Eating well and exercising regu-
larly come to mind. Yet without question, human addiction has often
led to great harm. Regarding drug addiction, Skelton quotes a psychi-
atrist and chief executive of a celebrity rehabilitation center as saying
“‘marijuana is clearly addictive.’”64 Even assuming this to be true,
later we shall see that users of marihuana were often Mexican and users of peyote
were often American Indian.
RICHARD J. BONNIE & CHARLES H. WHITEBREAD II, THE MARIJUANA CONVICTION: A HISTORY
OF MARIHUANA PROHIBITION IN THE UNITED STATES 30 (1974); see also MICHELLE ALEXANDER,
THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS (2010).
61. The Court has held that “arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement” of the law
violates due process. City of Chi. v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 56 (1999); see also Kolender v.
Lawson, 461 U.S. 352 (1983). Persons are entitled to fair notice of what is required to avoid
trouble with the law, especially the criminal law, and need not simply rely on the discretion
of police in deciding whether or not to arrest and charge them with crimes.
62. As Husak writes, “there is no general (criminal) offense of causing physical and/
or psychological harm to oneself.” Husak, supra note 4, at 201. R
63. See supra note 50. R
64. Skelton, supra note 17. R
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however, decades of studies65 conclude cannabis is less addictive than
alcohol or nicotine, which are merely regulated. Again, the equal lib-
erty principle rejects the harsher punishment of the less harmful
substance.
But let us assume, arguendo, all three substances are equally addic-
tive. The Supreme Court has held that addiction cannot constitution-
ally be a crime.66 Even if it could, equal liberty requires all addictions
to be punished in proportion to their severity. But tobacco and alco-
hol are merely regulated while cannabis is prohibited. From the equal
liberty perspective, then, any addictive potential of cannabis use can-
not justify this inconsistency in the law.
65. Claims of cannabis’ addictiveness are nothing new. They go back to the “reefer
madness” days of the 1930s. New York Mayor Fiorello LaGuardia was skeptical of the evi-
dence on which the 1937 Marijuana Tax Act was based. He thus commissioned a study of
the medical, sociological, and psychological aspects of marijuana use in New York City by
the internationally renowned New York Academy of Medicine. Dr. George B. Wallace,
Chairman of the Committee, summarized as follows:
Smoking marijuana can be stopped abruptly with no resulting medical or physical
distress comparable to that of morphine withdrawal in morphine addicts. . . .
From the study as a whole, it is concluded that marijuana is not a drug of addic-
tion, comparable to morphine, and that if tolerance is acquired, it is of a very
limited degree. Furthermore, those who have been smoking marihuana for a pe-
riod of years showed no mental or physical deterioration[,] which may be attrib-
uted to the drug.
George B. Wallace et al., The Marihuana Problem in the City of New York, in THE MARIHUANA
PAPERS 355, 404–05, 408 (David Solomon ed., 1966).
More recently, a Stanford medical professor wrote that: “Physical dependence is rarely
encountered in the usual patterns of social use [of marijuana], despite some degree of
tolerance that may develop . . . . Compared with other licit social drugs, such as alcohol,
tobacco, and caffeine, marijuana does not pose greater risks.” Leo E. Hollister, Health As-
pects of Cannabis, 38 PHARMACOLOGICAL REVS. 1, 17 (1986).
More recently yet, the Institute of Medicine concluded that “although few marijuana
users develop dependence, some do. But they appear to be less likely to do so than users of
other drugs (including alcohol and nicotine), and marijuana dependence appears to be
less severe than dependence on other drugs.” IOM, supra note 50, at 98. R
Most recently, “cannabis appears to have little addictive potential in the opinion of
most experts, particularly when compared to other common drugs, including caffeine.”
Robert Gore & Mitch Earleywine, Marijuana’s Perceived Addictiveness: A Survey of Clinicians
and Researchers, in POT POLITICS: MARIJUANA AND THE COSTS OF PROHIBITION, supra note 4, at R
176, 185. As two scholars thus conclude, “even though marijuana is by far the most widely
used illicit drug, its negative consequences are dwarfed by those of other drugs.” DAVID
BOYUM & PETER REUTER, AN ANALYTIC ASSESSMENT OF U.S. DRUG POLICY 1 (Marvin H. Kos-
ters ed., 2005), available at http://www.aei.org/files/2005/02/25/20050218_book812text.
pdf.
66. Specifically, the Court held that enforcement of such a law constitutes cruel and
unusual punishment. See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666–67 (1962). Following
suit, California appellate courts have also held that addiction is not a crime. See Blinder v.
Div. of Narcotics Enforcement, 101 Cal. Rptr. 635, 644 (Ct. App. 1972).
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Critics might reply that cannabis use would increase if prohibi-
tion were ended. As the drug czars wrote, for example, “[w]e can say
with near certainty . . . that marijuana use would increase if it were
legal.”67 But this “near certainty” is undercut by several sources.68 Re-
gardless, the relevant issue is not use, but abuse. Critics seem to as-
sume cannabis use is abuse by definition. By this logic, any alcohol or
nicotine use is abuse and must also be prohibited. Yet, just as millions
of adults can enjoy alcohol in moderation, the studies cited leave no
reason to doubt adults can also use a less addictive substance like can-
nabis in moderation. Even assuming, then, contrary to decades of
studies, that cannabis use would increase if its prohibition were en-
ded, this would not justify voting against a revision of the RCTCA.
B. Harms to Others
All agree that government may ban or punish acts that directly
cause serious harm to others. The RCTCA, accordingly, is clear that it
is not intended to affect laws regarding: (1) driving under the influ-
ence of cannabis; (2) coming to work under the influence of canna-
67. Drug Czars, supra note 17. R
68. The IOM, studying the Netherlands’ experience following decriminalization,
found that “there is little evidence that decriminalization of marijuana use necessarily leads
to a substantial increase in marijuana use.” IOM, supra note 50, at 104. According to a U.S. R
sponsored study in 2001, “existing research seems to indicate that there is little apparent
relationship between [the] severity of sanctions prescribed for drug use and prevalence or
frequency of use, and that perceived legal risk explains very little in the variance of individ-
ual drug use.” NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, INFORMING AMERICA’S POLICY ON ILLEGAL DRUGS:
WHAT WE DON’T KNOW KEEPS HURTING US 193 (Charles F. Manski, John V. Pepper & Carol
V. Petrie eds., 2001). At the international level, Schlosser observes:
Between 1988 and 1998, British arrests for marijuana nearly quadrupled, reach-
ing almost 100,000 a year. As many as 5,600 marijuana offenders were annually
imprisoned. And yet British marijuana use during that period continued to rise.
Despite having the most punitive marijuana laws in Europe, Great Britain soon had the
highest rate of marijuana use among young people.
ERIC SCHLOSSER, REEFER MADNESS: SEX, DRUGS, AND CHEAP LABOR IN THE AMERICAN BLACK
MARKET 69–70 (2003) (emphasis added).
Furthermore, after the UK decriminalized cannabis in 2004, the British Crime Survey
confirmed that its use declined. RACHEL MURPHY & STEPHEN ROE, DRUG MISUSE DECLARED:
FINDINGS FROM THE 2006/07 BRITISH CRIME SURVEY 1 (2007), available at http://webarchive.
nationalarchives.gov.uk/20110218135832/rds.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs07/hosb1807.
pdf. As MacCoun and Reuter write:
Dutch national rates [of cannabis usage] now are somewhat lower than those in
the United States . . . . [T]he Dutch have significantly reduced the monetary and
human costs of incarcerating cannabis offenders with no apparent effect on levels
of use. . . . [T]hroughout two decades of the 1976 policy, Dutch [cannabis] use
levels have remained at or below those in the United States.
MACCOUN & REUTER, supra note 50, at 256, 261, 263. R
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bis; or (3) providing cannabis to minors.69 Yet critics are legitimately
concerned about the law’s effect, not its intent. Thus, even conceding
that principles of right must prevail over pursuit of the good in a con-
stitutional democracy, critics can plausibly assert that the good
(preventing serious harm to others) is substantial and that the right
(to bodily autonomy) is trivial. Nonetheless, these three concerns do
not justify voting against revisions of the RCTCA in 2012 and beyond.
1. Effects on Children
I begin with concerns over minors. On this subject, Falcon re-
sponds to the “No on 19” Campaign’s concern over the prospect of
school bus operators driving under the influence.70 The op-ed critics,
however, express broader concerns over minors. The Los Angeles
Times, we saw, asked “What would be the effect of legalization . . . .
[o]n children?”71 Skelton quoted a doctor’s claim that “[d]rugs cause
tremendous hardships to children and families,”72 and in USA Today’s
words:
Our deepest concern is what would happen to children. Support-
ers of legalization underestimate how easy it would be for kids to
sneak pot at home if their parents began using it more frequently
and openly, and the legalizers fail to reckon with the danger of
sending children the message that pot is no big deal. Marijuana is
less addictive than harder drugs, but the addiction rate jumps as
high as 17% for kids who begin using at an early age, and early use
can set back a child’s mental development.73
On its face, of course, concern for children is legitimate, even
compelling.74 Special rules protecting minors are justifiably found
throughout our law.75 The RCTCA was thus clear, as the critics con-
cede, that providing cannabis to minors would have remained a
crime.76 Yet even assuming this law would have increased some chil-
dren’s access to cannabis, a revised RCTCA remains justified.
69. See RCTCA § 2(C)(2); CALIFORNIA OFFICIAL VOTER INFORMATION GUIDE, supra note
6, at 92–93.
70. Falcon, supra note 5, at 481; see text and cited materials infra Part II.B.2. R
71. Post-Prop 19, supra note 10. R
72. Skelton, supra note 17. R
73. If California Goes to Pot, Rest of U.S. Gets Dragged In, supra note 17. R
74. As Husak notes, “[t]his rationale has a tremendous appeal.” Husak II, supra note
59, at 53. R
75. Beyond the central relevance of the interests of minor children in divorce settle-
ments, for example, contracts are voidable at the option of parties who are minors and the
liability of minors for negligence is partly a function of their age.
76. Indeed, Falcon writes that “[t]he RCTCA went above and beyond to protect Cali-
fornia’s children.” Falcon, supra note 5, at 471. R
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To begin with government’s goals, the Court has held that gov-
ernment may not simply restrict what it pleases in order to make the
world safe for children, particularly when it burdens basic liberties. As
Justice Frankfurter famously observed in a free speech case:
We have before us legislation not reasonably restricted to the evil
with which it is said to deal. The incidence of this enactment is to
reduce the adult population of Michigan to reading only what is fit
for children. It thereby arbitrarily curtails one of those liberties of
the individual . . . enshrined in the Due Process Clause of the 14th
Amendment . . . .77
Beyond this, if Congress truly believed that it must protect minors
from ingesting substances in proportion with the risk of the actual
harm they pose, it would criminalize the ingestion of all dangerous
substances. Since it does not, its means are underinclusive given its
purported goal, and the protection of minors cannot be taken seri-
ously as an actual goal of national drug policy. USA Today expresses
concern over the message we would send children by ending cannabis
prohibition.78 Yet if we were really concerned about this message, it
seems we would instead end cannabis prohibition.79 This sends the
message that as a society we will finally end the hypocrisy of claiming
to protect children while treating the most destructive drugs with the
most leniency.80
Even assuming that minimizing minors’ access to cannabis is a
legitimate state interest, the problem remains that minors already
have easy access to cannabis on the black market. Further, the black
77. Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380, 383 (1957).
78. If California Goes to Pot, Rest of U.S. Gets Dragged In, supra note 17. R
79. In two writers’ words:
We permit adults to do many activities that we forbid children to do, such as
motorcycle riding, skydiving, signing contracts, getting married, drinking alcohol,
and smoking tobacco. But we do not condone arresting adults who responsibly
engage in these activities in order to dissuade our children from doing so. Nor
can we justify arresting adult marijuana smokers at the pace of some 734,000 per
year on the grounds of sending a message to children.
Keith Stroup & Paul Armentano, Editorial, The Problem Is Pot Prohibition, WASH. POST, May 4,
2002, at A19.
80. As a psychologist writes:
Our kids notice our self-justifying delusions regarding drug use. Alcohol is a good
drug except when you’re driving or if you use too much, when people become
violent and-or pathetic. Tobacco is a bad drug. People who smoke cigarettes are
ruining their health, but they are allowed to [do so] because it is a free country.
Heroin and cocaine are bad because they are addictive and illegal and sold by
bad people. Marijuana is not addictive and Dad and Mom tried it in college, but it
is illegal and therefore not really OK. Any wonder why kids just stop listening to
“just say no”?
John Keefe, Dispatches from the Drug War, BANGOR DAILY NEWS, May 11, 2006, at C1.
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market in marijuana is created and sustained by prohibition. As a sur-
vey by the National Institute on Drug Abuse (“NIDA”) found,
“[m]arijuana appears to be available to almost all high school seniors;
86% reported that they think it would be ‘very easy’ or ‘fairly easy’ for
them to get it—almost twice the number who reported ever having
used it (46%).”81 As Judge Gray observes:
[O]ur current system is completely unable to keep illicit drugs out
of our communities and away from our children . . . . Ask your
local high school or junior college students and they will tell
you . . . that it is easier for our children and underage adults to get
illicit drugs than it is for them to get alcohol.82
If anything, then, as with alcohol, cannabis regulation would diminish
minors’ access as well as the risks associated with having to obtain a
substance illegally.
Even putting ends aside, further, cannabis prohibition is prob-
lematic as a means of protecting minors. For one thing, even if we
follow USA Today in assuming that children of parents who would use
cannabis “more frequently and openly”83 if prohibition ended would
have easier access to that cannabis as a result, this fails to justify prohi-
bition for millions of childless adults. Cannabis prohibition is thus
sharply overinclusive in light of its purported ends. Beyond this, if
lockable cabinets work sufficiently well to bar children’s access to their
parents’ liquor that we need not resurrect alcohol prohibition, the
same technology should be sufficient for securing their cannabis.
In sum, while the welfare of minors is generally a legitimate state
concern, it does not justify voting against revisions of the RCTCA in
2012 and beyond.
81. LLOYD D. JOHNSTON, PATRICK M. O’MALLEY, JERALD G. BACHMAN & JOHN E. SCHU-
LENBERG, NAT’L INST. ON DRUG ABUSE, MONITORING THE FUTURE: NATIONAL SURVEY RESULTS
ON DRUG USE, 1975–2004: VOLUME I SECONDARY SCHOOL STUDENTS 397 (2005) (emphasis
omitted).
82. JAMES P. GRAY, WHY OUR DRUG LAWS HAVE FAILED AND WHAT WE CAN DO ABOUT
IT: A JUDICIAL INDICTMENT OF THE WAR ON DRUGS 50–51 (2001); see also Anita Hamilton et
al., This Bud’s for the U.S., TIME, Aug. 23, 2004, at 36–37. More recently, the National Center
on Addiction and Substance Abuse found “marijuana more available than ever, with 23%
of teens able to get the drug in an hour or less, and 42% of teens able to get it in a day or
less. It reveals a 35% increase over last year in terms of teens who can get the drug in a day or less.”
NAT’L CTR. ON ADDICTION & SUBSTANCE ABUSE AT COLUMBIA UNIV., 2008 NATIONAL SURVEY
OF AMERICAN ATTITUDES ON SUBSTANCE ABUSE at iii (2008), available at http://www.casa
columbia.org/articlefiles/380-2008%20Teen%20Survey%20Report.pdf (emphasis added).
83. If California Goes to Pot, Rest of U.S. Gets Dragged In, supra note 17. R
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2. Effects on Highway Safety and the Workplace
As noted, however, the critics raise plausible concerns about
highway safety and the workplace. As for highway safety, one op-ed
page writes: “The proposition does not affect current laws against driv-
ing while impaired by cannabis, but it does allow passengers to smoke
in a moving vehicle, proponents acknowledge.”84 The drug czars as-
sert that “[b]ecause marijuana negatively affects drivers’ judgment,
motor skills and reaction time, it stands to reason that legalizing mari-
juana would lead to more accidents and fatalities involving drivers
under its influence.”85 As Dumanis et al. opine, “San Diego County’s
roads would become more dangerous . . . with more drivers under the
influence and more drug-related accidents. Prop. 19 has no language
to prevent drivers from smoking immediately before driving and al-
lows passengers in a vehicle to smoke marijuana.”86
Falcon speaks to these concerns. He concedes that “marijuana
use and car accidents do sometimes coincide,”87 and that the RCTCA
failed to provide an objective test of cannabis intoxication.88 Yet he
notes that courts and legislatures have developed reasonably objective
standards for such intoxication.89 He proposes a “hybrid” model of
enforcement,90 and he suggests an exemption from the RCTCA for
employers of school bus drivers91 and perhaps commercial bus and
transportation companies.92 I add just two points.
First, studies have shown that people drive more cautiously under
the influence of cannabis than of alcohol. For example, a University
84. No on Prop. 19, supra note 17. R
85. Drug Czars, supra note 17. R
86. Dumanis et al., supra note 17. This claim seems misleading. Since the RCTCA is R
clear that it does not affect laws against driving under the influence of cannabis, it is not a
reasonable inference that it would allow someone to smoke immediately before driving.
Also misleading, USA Today adds that:
You wouldn’t want someone [under the influence of cannabis] . . . coming to-
ward you on the road, and while it would still be illegal to drive under the influ-
ence, that would almost certainly happen more often under legalization.
Marijuana smokers are three times more likely than sober drivers to crash.
If California Goes to Pot, Rest of U.S. Gets Dragged In, supra note 17. While cannabis smokers R
may be three times more likely than sober drivers to crash, the relevant comparison from
the equal liberty perspective is not to sober drivers but to drunken drivers.
87. Falcon, supra note 5, at 480. R
88. See id. at 477.
89. See id.
90. See id. at 488–89. This includes a suggestion that revisions of the RCTCA clarify
that it shall be illegal for smoked cannabis material to be present within motor vehicles. See
id. at 489.
91. See id. at 481.
92. See id. at 481, 488.
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of Maryland study of 2405 drivers hospitalized in auto accidents from
1997 to 2001 concluded that drivers who test positive for marijuana in
urine are no more likely to cause accidents than drug-free drivers.93
Other studies have made similar conclusions, partly due to the higher
caution exercised by cannabis-using drivers.94 Accordingly, since we
tolerate the greater risks of drunk driving for reasons well understood,
concerns over highway safety do not justify voting against revisions of
the RCTCA in 2012 and beyond.
Second, U.S. law has long distinguished the consumption of alco-
hol from the actions taken thereafter, like driving under its influence.
The equal liberty principle requires that we make the same distinction
with respect to cannabis. As Husak writes:
Undoubtedly, some recreational drug use in some circumstances—
for example, substantial alcohol use while driving—would threaten
fair terms of cooperation. Rational persons would demand assur-
ance that others not subject them to this risk. But a categorical
prohibition of alcohol is not needed to achieve this purpose. Fair
terms of cooperation are preserved by regulating the time, place,
and circumstances under which alcohol may be consumed. Simi-
larly, a categorical prohibition on each of those drugs currently
classified as illicit seems equally unnecessary for this purpose.95
93. See CARL SODERSTROM ET AL., ASS’N FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF AUTO. MED., CRASH
CULPABILITY RELATIVE TO AGE AND SEX FOR INJURED DRIVERS USING ALCOHOL, MARIJUANA OR
COCAINE 335–36 (2005). The study investigated the circumstances of each accident to as-
sess which drivers were at fault or culpable. Drivers testing positive for marijuana were
found to have no greater culpability than drug-free drivers. In every age group, alcohol was
the drug most strongly associated with crash culpability. Moreover, marijuana using-drivers
aged forty-one to sixty were statistically less likely to be at fault for accidents than drug free
drivers.
94. See Steven R. Lowenstein & Jane Koziol-McLain, Drugs and Traffic Crash Responsibil-
ity: A Study of Injured Motorists in Colorado, 50 J. TRAUMA 313, 315–18 (2001); K.L.L. Movig et
al., Psychoactive Substance Use and the Risk of Motor Vehicle Accidents, 36 ACCIDENT ANALYSIS &
PREVENTION 631, 633–35 (2004); Anthony Liguori, Marijuana and Driving: Trends, Design
Issues, and Future Recommendations, in POT POLITICS: MARIJUANA AND THE COSTS OF PROHIBI-
TION, supra note 4, at 71, 83–84. As Grinspoon and Bakalar write: R
The most careful study of this question indicated that effects of marihuana on
actual driving performance were small. Compensatory concentration and effort
usually overcame deficiencies caused by THC. Drivers under the influence of ma-
rihuana tended to overestimate its effects and compensated by concentrating
harder and slowing down. Drivers under the influence of alcohol, on the other
hand, underestimated its effects. As a result, marihuana impaired coordination
less and judgment far less than alcohol did.
GRINSPOON & BAKALAR, supra note 50, at 237. R
95. Douglas N. Husak, Liberal Neutrality, Autonomy, and Drug Prohibitions, 29 PHIL. &
PUB. AFF. 43, 55 (2000) [hereinafter Husak III]. See generally Rodney Skager, Revisioning
Youth Policy on Marijuana and Other Drug Use: Alternatives to Zero Tolerance, in POT POLITICS:
MARIJUANA AND THE COSTS OF PROHIBITION, supra note 4, at 300–02. R
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Turning to effects on the workplace, one editorial page wrote
that the RCTCA:
[W]ould put employers in a quandary by creating a protected class
of on-the-job smokers, bestowing a legal right to use marijuana at
work unless employers could actually prove that it would impair an
employee’s job performance. Employers would no longer have the
right to screen for marijuana use or discipline a worker for being
high. But common sense dictates that a drug-free environment is
crucial at too many workplaces to name—schools, hospitals, emer-
gency response and public safety agencies, among others.96
Apart from propaganda like “common sense” and “drug free en-
vironment,” this seems to raise a legitimate concern. Just as an em-
ployer can rightly expect that he need not tolerate a drunken
employee, he need not tolerate one under the influence of canna-
bis.97 As with highway safety, further, the bodily autonomy of adults in
the home does not dispose of this concern any more than it protects
an individual who drinks a quart of scotch in ten minutes at home
immediately before driving his car on city streets. In both cases, what
matters is the serious risk of real harm that ingestion of a drug directly
poses to others.98 Again, however, alcohol and pharmaceuticals are
merely regulated for reasons well understood, and the attendant risks
of such a legal regime come with owning and running a business in a
free society. Employers must already unavoidably deal with such
problems. The equal liberty principle requires that we treat the less
96. Vote No on Prop. 19: A Debate on Legalizing Marijuana May Be Needed, But This Initia-
tive Has Too Many Flaws, supra note 17; see also No on Prop. 19, supra note 17. The day after R
Proposition 19 was defeated, the Los Angeles Times referred to its “ludicrous workplace pro-
tections for marijuana-smoking employees.” Post-Prop 19, supra note 10. R
97. To be sure, many report that cannabis enhances the quality of their work. See
GRINSPOON & BAKALAR, supra note 50, at 277–82. Yet it can also be counterproductive and R
even dangerous. As Falcon observes:
If the RCTCA were broadly construed, . . . it is possible that the law could be read
to allow those employees who are “high functioning” while stoned to come to
work under the influence, or else that an employer would have to prove in court
actual performance impairment due to being under the influence. I believe that
employers ought to be able to take action against an employee who smokes mari-
juana immediately before or during the break in between work hours. Employers
ought to have the right to decide what an employee does during the hours he is
engaged in his chosen occupation. The employer pays for that time, and being
able to dictate the conduct of his employees during that time seems inherent in
the relationship itself.
Falcon, supra note 5, at 482. On this basis, he makes the unobjectionable suggestion that R
revisions of the RCTCA should include a provision that employers are not required to
allow employee cannabis use, possession, or distribution on company hours. See id. at 488.
98. Accordingly, once again, the RCTCA was clear that it was not intended to affect
the workplace. RCTCA § 2(C)(2); CALIFORNIA OFFICIAL VOTER INFORMATION GUIDE, supra
note 6, at 92–93. R
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harmful substance no more harshly than we do the more harmful
substance.
Cannabis, we have seen, is less harmful than tobacco or alcohol.99
A fair application of the equal liberty principle, on which we all rely,
thus compels that cannabis not be treated more harshly by the law. As
democratic citizens we are obliged to apply this principle in an even-
handed way in our own political acts, as when voting on ballot initia-
tives like the RCTCA. If we do not, we have no legitimate expectation
that others give our interests due consideration when the law violates
equal liberty to our detriment. I conclude that critics’ comments re-
garding highway safety and the workplace provide no basis to reject
revisions of the RCTCA in 2012 and beyond.
III. Structure: Intergovernmental Concerns
Yet the critics still seem to have some powerful arrows in their
quivers. We thus turn to their structural critiques: the level of govern-
ment at which jurisdiction over cannabis law is and should be lodged.
A. Federal v. State Power: Supremacy and Preemption
A common critique of the RCTCA was that it would conflict with
federal law, which is supreme. As the Los Angeles Times wrote, for ex-
ample, under the RCTCA, “marijuana, though legal under California
law, would remain a prohibited Schedule I drug under federal law,
setting up an inevitable conflict.”100 The constitutional principle refer-
enced here is familiar: under the Supremacy Clause federal law
preempts contrary state law.101 I reply, however, that the mere exis-
tence of federal cannabis prohibition is no reason to reject revisions
of the RCTCA.
To begin, it is not clear that federal cannabis prohibition under
the CSA would preempt a revision of the RCTCA. At best, this is an
open legal question. For one thing, the Supreme Court has not fully
spoken on the constitutionality of federal cannabis prohibition. It has
never, that is, squarely tested the CSA as applied to activities that
would have been protected by the RCTCA. United States v. Oakland
99. See If California Goes to Pot, Rest of U.S. Gets Dragged In, supra note 17. R
100. Experimenting with Pot, supra note 17; see also Skelton, supra note 17; Vote No on Prop. R
19: A Debate on Legalizing Marijuana May Be Needed, But This Initiative Has Too Many Flaws,
supra note 17. R
101. U.S. CONST. art. VI.
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Cannabis Buyers’ Cooperative102 was a statutory ruling, and Gonzales v.
Raich103 held only that the CSA is generally a permissible exercise of
Congress’ commerce power and that the DEA may thus enforce it.
This question is distinct from whether federal cannabis prohibition
violates the equal liberty principle as articulated in the Court’s Four-
teenth Amendment case law. As Husak observes:
[A] right to use drugs is unlikely to be explicitly included in
a[ ] . . . constitution. But this concession does not settle the matter;
rights to marry or to use contraceptives are equally improbable
candidates for explicit inclusion. . . . [Also improbable are] deci-
sions about what foods to eat or what clothes to wear . . . . Many
questions about the scope of constitutional protection afforded to
such conduct are unexplored in our legal system, mainly because
contemporary liberal states have rarely sought to punish them. No
case law exists about issues that have never been addressed.104
Beyond this, we saw that the Frank/Paul bill was recently intro-
duced in the House.105 While it will not receive a hearing any time
soon, it reminds us that federal cannabis prohibition is not necessarily
a permanent legal fact. If states vote to end cannabis prohibition
under their law, it can only increase pressure on Congress to pass a
law like Frank/Paul. Our Constitution allows several avenues for re-
form. One such avenue is states sending a message to Washington by
protecting liberties the latter seeks to criminalize.
Finally, Professor Mikos recently noted an important distinction.
When Congress legalizes an activity that has been banned by state law,
Mikos observes, all agree that the latter is unenforceable.106 By con-
trast, he argues, when Congress criminalizes a liberty that has been
protected by a state, neither the legal status nor the practical import
of the state law is clear.107 This is consistent with the well-established
102. 532 U.S. 483, 486 (2001) (holding that the CSA includes no medical necessity
exception).
103. 545 U.S. 1 (2005). I have argued elsewhere that federal cannabis prohibition
under the CSA not only exceeds Congress’ commerce power but also violates the Tenth
Amendment. See generally Martin D. Carcieri, Gonzales v. Raich: Congressional Tyranny and
Irrelevance in the War on Drugs, 9 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1131 (2007).
104. Husak III, supra note 95, at 59 (emphasis added); see also Dan Riffle, Prop 19 and
Constitutional Law for Dummies (and DEA Administrators), MPP BLOG, (Oct. 13, 2010), http://
blog.mpp.org/tax-and-regulate/prop-19-and-constitutional-law-for-dummies-and-dea-ad-
ministrators/10132010/.
105. See supra note 20. R
106. See Robert A. Mikos, On the Limits of Supremacy: Medical Marijuana and the States’
Overlooked Power to Legalize Federal Crime, 62 VAND. L. REV. 1421 (2009).
107. Id. Using the “state-of-nature” standard, Mikos argues that constraints on Con-
gress’ preemption power by the anti-commandeering rule make it quite appropriate that
state medical marijuana statutes are de facto law in those states.
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principle that states may, if they wish, protect individual rights under
their constitutions at a higher level than does the U.S. Constitution.108
Thus, it is at best an open question whether the mere existence of
federal cannabis prohibition renders a contrary right under state law
void.
Yet, for the sake of argument, let us assume a revised RCTCA
would directly conflict with the CSA, triggering preemption. Falcon,
advising those revising the RCTCA, must assume this. Yet from the
broader perspective of a citizen voting on such measures, to conclude
that nothing can or should be done at the state level to oppose federal
prohibition assumes that what is, ought to be. Since prohibition is the
law, this view holds, we ought simply to accept rather than to oppose
it. Had such a view prevailed in the past, of course, there would never
have been a Fourteenth Amendment, or even a Declaration of Inde-
pendence. Progress in the law has always necessarily depended on the
distinction between what the law is and what it ought to be in light of
deeper, enduring principles.109 The critics’ premise that we ignore
this distinction is indefensible. If there are compelling reasons to op-
pose a gross inconsistency in the law, especially the criminal law, then
it is the right of democratic citizens to resist it. Indeed, it is their duty,
especially where the means employed—voting—are lawful. Unlike
civil disobedience, militancy, or revolution,110 voting is not just legal,
it is a fundamental constitutional right.111
In this light, USA Today’s claim that “legalization is a decision that
should be made by the entire country, not just one state,”112 misun-
derstands the role of our federalism. As Justice Brandeis famously
wrote, “[I]t is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a
108. The Supreme Court has referred to a state’s “sovereign right to adopt in its own
Constitution individual liberties more expansive than those conferred by the Federal Con-
stitution.” Pruneyard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 81 (1980); see also California v.
Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 43 (1988); Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 62 (1967); Daffin v.
State ex rel. Okla. Dep’t of Mines, 251 P.3d 741, 747 n.20 (Okla. 2011); United States v.
Garner, 945 F. Supp. 990, 997 (N.D. Tex. 1996) (referring to “the historic principle that
the United States Constitution provides a floor to a citizen’s civil rights while the state
constitutions provide a ceiling”).
109. ROBERT L. HAYMAN, JR., NANCY LEVIT & RICHARD DELGADO, JURISPRUDENCE CLASSI-
CAL AND CONTEMPORARY 74–80 (2002).
110. See RAWLS, supra note 32, at 308–41, 363–77. For Rawls, civil disobedience is justifi- R
able where the law merely violates the fair equality of opportunity principle. A fortiori,
where the law violates the more fundamental equal liberty principle, means far less drastic
than civil disobedience, like the constitutionally protected power to vote, are easily
justifiable.
111. See Harper v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966).
112. If California Goes to Pot, Rest of U.S. Gets Dragged In, supra note 17. R
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single courageous state may, if its citizens choose, serve as a labora-
tory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to
the rest of the country.”113 This is especially so with a classic police
power concern like cannabis regulation. Boychik writes, “[T]hough
there may be excellent reasons for California to go toe to toe with the
federal government over the federalism question, does it really have
to about this issue? Right now?”114 The answer is yes. As with the re-
cent repeal of “Don’t Ask/Don’t Tell,” if it is the right thing to do, it is
the right thing to do now. Indeed, Falcon notes, not only is there a
“strong argument to be made for the value in varied laws,”115 but
“when legalization comes, it will not start at the federal level. . . . State
action is the only way to legalize marijuana.”116
For these reasons, preemption concerns about a revised RCTCA
are unpersuasive. Even assuming the CSA would preempt such a revi-
sion, there are good reasons, rooted in the equal liberty principle, to
oppose federal law by voting in state elections.
B. State v. Local Power
1. “Regulatory Chaos”
Critics raised additional structural concerns. Some of them as-
serted the RCTCA was poorly drafted and would thus have created
“regulatory chaos.” This was because “[i]t would empower the state’s
hundreds of city and county governments to set their own regulations
for growing, selling, using and taxing marijuana.”117 As the San Fran-
113. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissent-
ing); see also K.K. DuVivier, Fast-Food Government and Physician-Assisted Death: The Role of Direct
Democracy in Federalism, 86 OR. L. REV. 895, 899 (2007) (referring to states as “Brandeis
laborator[ies]”). The USA Today editors might reply that a law like Proposition 19 does
create a “risk to the rest of the country” insofar as it would be “potentially flooding the rest
of the nation with cheap supplies.” If California Goes to Pot, Rest of U.S. Gets Dragged In, supra
note 17. Yet beyond the fact that it is not clear that cannabis would be so “cheap” if it were R
taxed, states impact other states in many ways, as with gambling, welfare, and alcohol laws.
Again, such interaction among states is a feature of federalism.
The drug czars claim that RCTCA supporters mistakenly rely on the Dutch example,
insofar as the Dutch have dramatically reduced the number of coffee shops. Drug Czars,
supra note 17. Yet, it is telling that the remedy to which the Dutch have not resorted in R
dealing with the problem is cannabis prohibition. Rather, they have simply adjusted their
regulatory scheme, as they do for other drugs when necessary. The drug czars’ reference
thus appears to backfire.
114. Ben Boychuk, Editorial, Take the Initiative: For Conservatives, the Real Question Is, Is
This Any Way to Run a State?, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 31, 2010, at A41.
115. Falcon, supra note 5, at 483. R
116. Id. at 492.
117. If California Goes to Pot, Rest of U.S. Gets Dragged In, supra note 17. R
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cisco Chronicle added, “Proposition 19 allows the 58 counties and hun-
dreds of cities to come up with their own taxation and regulatory
schemes.”118 The Los Angeles Times proclaimed, “[T]he proposition is
in fact an invitation to chaos. It would permit each of California’s 478
cities and 58 counties to create local regulations regarding the cultiva-
tion, possession and distribution of marijuana. . . . In Los Angeles
County alone it could mean 88 different sets of regulations.”119
At first blush, the critics seem to raise a legitimate concern. Yet
these statements simply state facts about the RCTCA without showing
exactly what the problem is or how it compares to similar problems in
other regulatory schemes. Citizens and business owners tolerate local
variation in many areas of law, from speed limits to tax rates to alcohol
regulations. Moreover, the RCTCA would have allowed cities and
counties to opt out of having cannabis dispensaries while immunizing
suppliers from criminal prosecution for possession under state law.120
Falcon casts the “regulatory chaos” issue as whether the state should
encourage large or small-scale cannabis production.121 He argues for
the latter—for keeping the industry “Mom ‘n’ Pop” with state law
“regulating to encourage small-scale production.”122 Whether or not
RCTCA revisions follow Falcon’s precise counsel on this point, if they
place primary regulatory control over cannabis production at the state
level, critics cannot credibly denounce such an adjustment as totalitar-
ian central planning. Concentrating substantial power in the state is
consistent with a healthy federalism.
2. Doubts Regarding Tax Revenue
Critics are left with one last claim justifying cannabis prohibition
in the face of alcohol and tobacco regulation. As the San Francisco
Chronicle writes, the RCTCA “does nothing to help cure the state’s
budget deficit.”123 Once again, this applies a different criterion to can-
nabis than to other substances. Liquor and cigarette taxes have not
cured the deficit either, yet this has not led us to make their sale and
118. No on Prop. 19, supra note 17. R
119. Vote No on Prop. 19: A Debate on Legalizing Marijuana May Be Needed, But This Initia-
tive Has Too Many Flaws, supra note 17; see also Experimenting with Pot, supra note 17; No on R
Prop. 19, supra note 17 (noting that the “nightmare” created by Proposition 215 has led to R
dispensary moratoria).
120. See RCTCA §§ 11301, 11303; CALIFORNIA OFFICIAL VOTER INFORMATION GUIDE,
supra note 6, at 93–94. Falcon’s observation that “[t]here is a strong argument to be made
for the value in varied laws” is thus relevant here as well. Falcon, supra note 5, at 483. R
121. Falcon, supra note 5, at 486. R
122. Id.
123. No on Prop. 19, supra note 17. R
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possession a crime. Furthermore, this claim seems misleading. While
any tax revenues under the RCTCA would have gone to local rather
than state coffers, they would to that extent have made localities less
dependent on state support. In this sense, the RCTCA would have
done something to ease the state budget deficit.
The drug czars ask: “Why would people volunteer to pay high
taxes on marijuana if it were legalized? The answer is that many would
not, and the underground market, adapting to undercut any new
taxes, would barely diminish at all.”124 “Many,” of course, is a vague
term. Relatively few people who consume fruits and vegetables grow
these items for themselves. They are less expensive than cannabis, but
as surely as many would opt to grow their own cannabis, many would
buy from dispensaries, as they do now for medicinal use. Consumers
rationally prefer choosing from a variety of products where quality is
guaranteed rather than taking their chances on the black market. The
drug czars’ cheap cynicism and low opinion of cannabis users thus
proves nothing. It is just as plausible that, inspired by their govern-
ment finally ending a century of a destructive, hypocritical policy, a
great many would be glad, even proud, to pay a tax on cannabis, espe-
cially if they know that tax revenue is directed to a “sympathetic public
cause, such as education or health care.”125
Finally, the Los Angeles Times writes that the tax revenue would
depend on untried bureaucracies and enforcement agencies.126
There are three replies. First, such administrative adjustments are a
natural consequence of legislative reform. When the United States en-
ded alcohol prohibition or created the Department of Homeland Se-
curity, new bureaucracies and law enforcement divisions had to be,
and were, established.127 This is what one would expect in ending a
century of cannabis prohibition.
Second, Mikos argues that states’ ability to tax cannabis as effec-
tively as they do tobacco and alcohol is undermined precisely because
of federal prohibition. It creates legal uncertainty and thus the condi-
124. Drug Czars, supra note 17. R
125. Falcon, supra note 5, at 490. R
126. See, e.g., Vote No on Prop. 19: A Debate on Legalizing Marijuana May Be Needed, But This
Initiative Has Too Many Flaws, supra note 17; Experimenting with Pot, supra note 17; Post-Prop R
19, supra note 10. R
127. As one scholar has written, “States responded with comprehensive regulatory
schemes affecting all aspects of the liquor industry.” Vijay Shanker, Note, Alcohol Direct
Shipment Laws, the Commerce Clause, and the Twenty-First Amendment, 85 VA. L. REV. 353, 353
(1999). As another observes, repeal of prohibition ushered in “a series of state-by-state
codes, regulations, and enforcement procedures.” OKRENT, supra note 25. R
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tions of a quasi-black market in which cannabis suppliers and vendors
are forced to operate.128 In this light, and to this extent, any doubts
regarding the tax revenue that would flow from ending cannabis pro-
hibition cannot be assessed against the merits of a revised RCTCA.
Finally, if RCTCA revisions place most regulatory and taxing au-
thority at the state level, this criticism dissolves. There will be few if
any “untried bureaucracies and enforcement agencies” at the local
level. Doubts regarding tax revenue thus do not justify voting against
revisions of the RCTCA. Rather, voting to send the strongest possible
message of opposition to federal prohibition is well justified.
Conclusion
The criticism of the RCTCA we have reviewed has raised legiti-
mate concerns. As Falcon notes, such critiques are a step forward in
the debate over cannabis law reform.129 From a constitutional per-
spective, however, I have argued that none of them justifies voting
against revisions of the RCTCA in 2012 and beyond. In particular, I
have argued that the criminal prohibition of cannabis, while far more
harmful drugs like alcohol and nicotine are merely regulated for rea-
sons widely understood, violates the equal liberty principle at the core
of the U.S. Constitution, particularly as expressed in the Court’s Four-
teenth Amendment case law.
This is not lost on President Obama. If reelected, he should call
on Congress to end federal cannabis prohibition, letting states go
their own way within loose federal guidelines.130 As noted, however, in
an apparent bid for conservative support in his run for reelection,
President Obama has recently authorized crackdowns on medical can-
nabis dispensaries.131 After all, observe Grinspoon and Bakalar,
“[C]ulturally conservative people are fearful of marihuana.”132 In this
connection, Skager has referenced “the legacy of Harry Anslinger . . .
implanted in the conservative psyche.”133 As a Harvard economist re-
cently noted, however, “vigorous opposition to the drug war should be
a no-brainer for conservatives.”134 Indeed, the heroic dissents by Jus-
128. Robert A. Mikos, State Taxation of Marijuana Distribution and Other Federal Crimes,
2010 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 223, 244 (2010).
129. See Falcon, supra note 5, at 475. R
130. See Carcieri, supra note 16, at 308. R
131. Egelko, supra note 14, at A1. R
132. GRINSPOON & BAKALAR, supra note 50, at 267. R
133. Skager, supra note 95, at 307. R
134. Jeffrey A. Miron, Editorial, Common Cause: Conservatism and Opposition to the Drug
War Should Go Hand in Hand, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 29, 2010, at A23.
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tices O’Connor, Rehnquist, and Thomas in Raich prove that princi-
pled conservatives need not fear liberal social policy.
In this light, the Frank/Paul bill135 is highly symbolic. Co-au-
thored by two otherwise adverse ideological icons of the House, it em-
bodies a broad consensus among liberals and many conservatives on
cannabis prohibition.136 Even if President Obama cannot do so dur-
ing his first term, then, if reelected he should use his 2013 State of the
Union address to urge Congress to pass Frank/Paul. If even one state
ends cannabis prohibition by initiative in 2012, the force of the Presi-
dent’s appeal will be strengthened. For this reason as well as those
presented above, citizens are well justified in voting for revisions of
the RCTCA in 2012 and beyond, especially if they incorporate the
changes advised by Falcon.
135. H.R. 2306, 112th Cong. (1st Sess. 2011).
136. Indeed, the consensus is far broader than congressional bipartisanship. The
Global Commission on Drug Policy recently found that the global anti-drug effort has been
a total failure and recommended that governments replace such policies with more hu-
mane and effective ones. See Charles M. Blow, Op-Ed, Drug Bust, N.Y. TIMES, June 11, 2011,
at A21; Jimmy Carter, Op-Ed, Call off the Global Drug War, N.Y. TIMES, June 17, 2011, at A35.
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